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ADOPTION BY SAME-SEX COUPLES AND
THE USE OF THE REPRESENTATION
REINFORCEMENT THEORY TO
PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILDREN
By Nadia Stewart
ABSTRACT

This Note discusses the growing trend of adoptions by same-sex couples in
the United States. Although most states do not outrightprohibit adoptions by
same-sex partners,it is often very difficult for both partnersto adopt the same
child. This Note will explore the legal and social ramifications of adoption
limitations and the effects they may have on the adoptive children of same-sex
couples. Additionally, this Note will explore how the situation can be remedied using the principle of representationreinforcement.
Part one of this Note gives a briefoverview of the development of the representation reinforcement theory. The representationreinforcement theory corrects the injustices of a democratic political system that occur when majority
rule unfairly burdens the fundamental rights of a minority. Part two of this
Note assesses and addresses the types of adoptions that occur in the United
States and how they are applied unevenly and unfairly so as to burden potential adoptive children of same-sex partners. Part three of this Note assesses
and reviews the variances in adoption statutes and how they affect the rights
and statuses of adoptive children. Partfour of this Note addressesthe importance of recognizing adoptive children as a class that requires judicialprotection because their interests are not properly represented in the political
process.
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INTRODUCTION

On a cold and icy Christmas Eve in 2007, the state of West Virginia
asked Kathryn Kutil and Cheryl Hess to foster a brand new baby girl,
TiCasey.' TiCasey was a beautiful baby and a dream come true for
the couple; however, she was born with cocaine and opiates in her
system. 2 TiCasey suffered from extreme withdrawal symptoms and
was difficult to care for, but the couple fell in love with the red headed
baby girl instantly and wanted to adopt her making her forever a part
of their family.3
TiCasey, along with five other foster children, was cared for by
Hess, a stop-at-home mother, and Kutil, a nursing home director.'
The state Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) relied on the couple to take high-risk children into their home at any
time, day or night.' The couple opened their hearts and home to more
than eighteen foster children over the years.6
Only a few months prior to TiCasey's arrival in the Kutil-Hess
home, Kutil adopted Renee, one of the foster children, making her the
family's first permanent child and Kutil's legal daughter.' DHHR was
aware that the couple also wanted to adopt TiCasey, therefore the
agency issued a permanency plan.' The plan stated that TiCasey's
adoption by the couple would be "appropriate."' Although West Virginia had approximately 4,200 children in state custody, with almost
one-third of them living in group homes or institutions, adopting TiCasey proved to be a difficult feat.' 0 After a routine visit, TiCasey's
court-appointed attorney, confirmed that the baby was in a comforta1. Pamela Paul, The Battle over a Baby, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 26, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/magazine/26lesbian-t.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

10. Id.
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ble and physically safe environment where she "seemed to be doing
well. . . ."" However, the attorney petitioned for removal of the baby

because she was in a homosexual household.12 The court initially allowed TiCasey to remain with Kutil and Hess, the only parents she
knew, while her adoption case was under review.' 3
Despite spending over eleven months in one of the best foster
homes DHHR had, the court ordered that TiCasey be removed from
the only home and family she knew and placed with another foster
family, the Thompsons.14 The court stated that "the best interest of a
child is to be raised by a traditional family, mother and father.""
Only five days after TiCasey arrived at the Thompson's home, the
family informed DHHR that they were no longer interested in adopting her, so TiCasey was uprooted again and moved to yet another fos-

ter home.16
Three hours after TiCasey's second upheaval and removal from a
foster home, the West Virginia Supreme Court granted an emergency
stay and allowed the baby girl to reunite with Kutil and Hess so that
she could remain in their home with her brothers and sisters." Kutil
and Hess have been supported by almost everyone in the community,
even those who do not agree with their lifestyle." On June 5, 2009,
almost a year and a half after TiCasey first arrived at the couple's
home, the West Virginia Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion
condemning the lower court's decision to "ignore the bond forged between TiCasey and her foster parents[.]" 1 9 The Court stated that
adoption proceedings should begin immediately, and that Kutil or
Hess should at the very least be considered, if not favored, in the
adoptive parent selection process for TiCasey.2 0

II.

THE SUPREME COURT's DUTY TO PROTECT CHILDREN
AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION

It is commonly believed that children are one of the United States'
most precious and valuable assets because they are critical to a successful future. The rights of most children in the United States are
protected by parents, grandparents, relatives, and even the community. However, there are groups of children who do not have parents
or relatives and are merely hoping for permanent homes.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The 115,00021 plus children who are available for adoption in the
United States need representation and consistency. Children ready
for adoption far out-number qualified adoptive families. Trends do
indicate an increase in the number of single-parent adoptions, but the
number of children in need of a permanent home continues to grow.
Although the need for adoptive families is tremendous, the process of
adopting a child can prove to be quite difficult, especially for same-sex
couples that would like to adopt children and create a family together.
Each of the fifty states have different approaches to the adoption of
children, but almost all states base the ultimate decision on the "best
interest of the child," a determination that is made by individual
judges frequently without the benefit of well-defined guidelines.
Many state adoption statutes will only allow adoption of a child by
one same-sex partner and not the other; leaving many children with
only one parent who is legally and financially obligated to care for
them. When children are only allowed to be adopted by one parent
and not two they are placed at a significant disadvantage legally, socially, and economically. This Note asserts that adopted children deserve the rights and benefits of having two parents when possible; the
status of being recognized as a child of two parents is one that should
be protected by the courts.
Due to the fact that adoptive children are a class of citizens that are
not adequately represented in the democratic political process, the Supreme Court should use the theory of representation reinforcement to
ensure the rights of these children are protected. It would be ideal for
each state to have an adoption statute that is consistent and cohesive,
but this would require significant and lengthy legislative action. Because of adoptive children's lack of power and representation in the
political process, especially in the case of children who may be
adopted by an unmarried same-sex couple, the children do not have
adequate resources or influence to ensure their rights are being protected. Recognition of the adoptive children as children of both samesex parents wanting to adopt them, will afford the children the rights
they deserve and will benefit from. Adoptive children like TiCasey
and her brothers and sisters will be afforded the legal, social, physical,
and emotional benefits derived from the stability of having two legal
parents. Using the theory of representation reinforcement to give
adoptive children these rights will also be beneficial and cost-effective
for society in general.
Although recognition of same-sex marriages would resolve many of
the dual-parent adoption issues addressed in this Note, same-sex marriage is not necessary to ensure that the rights of adoptive children are
protected. The focus of this Note is on the rights of the adoptive chil21. CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-320, § 310, 124 Stat.
3459.
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dren not the rights of same-sex parents. The issue of same-sex marriage is a topic that is at the forefront of many social debates; it is
beyond the scope of this Note and, in many respects, is irrelevant to
the discussion. The public sentiment regarding extending marital
rights to same-sex partners may be very different to the public's sentiments regarding the rights of children who do not have permanent
homes or families.
Part I of this Note gives a brief overview of the development of the
representation reinforcement theory. Part 1I of this Note assesses and
addresses the types of adoptions that occur in the United States. Part
III of this Note assesses and reviews the different types of adoption
statutes in this country and how they affect the rights and statuses of
adoptive children. Part IV of this Note addresses the importance of
recognizing adoptive children as a class of people that require judicial
protection because their interests are not properly represented in the
political process.
A.

Explanation of Representation Reinforcement

In a 1938 Commerce Clause case, United States v. Carolene Products, Justice Stone wrote what has been called "the most famous footnote in constitutional law," footnote number four:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes [such as voting, expression, and political
association] which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal
of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation.... Nor need
we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities[;] [conditions], whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 22
Many scholars have credited this footnote, along with Justice Stone,
for the concept of applying a higher level of scrutiny, or review, in
cases that involve legislation aimed at "discrete and insular minorities." The footnote has been used in modern times to justify judicial
activism when minorities are being overrun by the majority voters in
the democratic process.2 3
22. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations
omitted).
23. Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of
Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONsT.
COMMENT. 277, 278 (1995).
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Out of this footnote has come a theory dubbed by scholars as representation reinforcement. This theory is most notably explained by
John Hart Ely in Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Re-

view.24 Ely's rationale for judicial review is based on the concept that
the court is actually promoting democracy by overturning decisions
made solely by, and for, the majority who are "chocking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs
will stay out."2 5
Not only scholars, but the Supreme Court itself has recognized the
value of the representation reinforcement theory. In Schneider v.
State of New Jersey, the Court stated that in cases involving legislation
that restricts fundamental rights, there should be a more stringent examination of the challenged legislation and how it will affect both majority and minority factions of society.26 The Court held that stringent
examination of legislation was necessary because legislative beliefs on
matters of public convenience may be enough to regulate personal
activities but may not be enough to justify regulation of the exercise of
rights "vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions."2 7 Judicial
review of legislation means "the delicate and difficult task falls upon
the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free
enjoyment of the rights.""
The representation reinforcement theory establishes that as far as
fundamental rights are concerned, the courts have the duty to ensure
that no group or class is subject to the permanent control of the majority.2 9 Representation reinforcement is based on the principle that
the Supreme Court, under the Constitution, is delegated the task of
safeguarding "the basic democratic theory of our government." 30 Oppression caused by the rule of the majority that impacts, and in some
instances dictates, the fundamental rights of minority groups, must be
overseen by the Court to ensure that the rights of minority groups are
not disregarded. This oversight will cause the democratic political
process to work fairly, smoothly, and successfully. Ely uses Stone's
famous footnote number four as a basis to assert that the Court has
two roles: first, "to keep the machinery of democratic government
running as it should, to make sure the channels of political participation and communication are kept open"" and, second, "[to] concern
itself with what majorities do to minorities, particularly . . . laws di24. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
(Harvard Univ. Press 2002) (1938).
25. Id. at 103.
26. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. ELY, supra note 23, at 45.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 76.

DISTRUST:

A

THEORY OF

JUDICIAL REVIEW
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rected at religious, national, and racial minorities and those infected
by prejudice against them. "32
B.

Groups Entitled to Representation Reinforcement-Discrete and
Insular Minorities

In order to establish whether a person or group of people may be
entitled to representation reinforcement, it must be determined that
the person or group of people is a discrete and insular minority. The
Supreme Court has not offered a list of whom it considers to be discrete and insular minorities, but it has suggested characteristics that it
may consider to make the determination. Lack of power in the political system, immutability of a defining trait, and unfair stereotypes are
a few of the characteristics the Court will consider, although none of
the characteristics are dispositive nor necessary for the Court to determine whether or not a discrete and insular minority exists." The
Court has stated that no single characteristic will determine whether a
group is a discrete and insular minority and experience, not logic, will
be the primary guide.34 These defining characteristics may, however,
point to social and cultural isolation which leads the majority to disregard the interests of others and ignore the impact that a piece of influential and possibly life-altering legislation may have on a minority
group.
The Court has addressed the political powerlessness of minors on
many occasions and has concluded that they are not a discrete and
insular minority group. Due to the fact that everyone in society has
been a minor and may also have minor children of their own, the
Court suggests that the rights of minors are respected and considered,
and they are therefore properly represented.3 6 Although minors are
not considered a discrete and insular minority, the subset of minor
children who do not have parents and who can potentially be adopted
by same-sex parents are likely a discrete and insular minority. The
status of being a child without parents is immutable in the sense that a
child cannot change his or her status. Potential adoptive children do
lack power in the political process because they are minors without
parents to represent them.
The Court goes on to say that determining discreteness and insularity must be a social and cultural, as well as political determination, and
that judges are best suited for the task." As is the case in many criti32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973).
Id. at 28.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 (1985).
Id.
Id.
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cal legal determinations: "[A] page of history is worth a volume of
logic." 38
If the Court weighed in and used policy and logic to determine a
consistent and flexible approach to the adoption of children in the
United States that allows two unmarried same-sex partners to jointly
adopt a child, it may alleviate the confusion and frustration that occurs during the adoption process. Streamlining the adoption process
to promote stability, consistency, and to allow not one, but two samesex parents to adopt, would undoubtedly protect the best interest of
adoptive children. Currently there are many different forms of adoptions allowed in different parts of the United States and they are used
unevenly and inconsistently, making adoption difficult and at times
impossible for certain parents.
III.

FORMS OF ADOPTION AVAILABLE TO SAME-SEX COUPLES

A.

Second-ParentAdoption or Co-ParentAdoption:

The term second-parentadoption was first used in legal literature by
Elizabeth Zuckerman in a 1986 Davis Law Review Paper on Lesbian
Families." Zuckerman used second-parent adoption "to designate
the adoption of a child by her parent's non-marital partner, without
requiring the first parent to give up any rights or responsibilities to the
child."4 0 Second-parent adoption essentially allows two unmarried
people to become the legal adopted parents of a child, giving both
parents legal rights to that child as well as giving the child the legal
and financial benefit of two parents.41 Second-parent adoption can
apply to heterosexual couples who reject the institution of marriage,
but it is a tool primarily used by same-sex couples who are unable to
marry, but nevertheless want to adopt and raise a child together.42
Most states will allow a homosexual person to adopt a child as a single
parent, but there is a significant number of states that do not allow
same-sex partners to adopt a child together. Second-parent adoptions, if recognized by all states, would allow couples to adopt jointly,
or at least authorize one partner to adopt a child and then allow the
other to petition the court for a second-parent or co-parent adoption
of that child.43
Currently only nine states-Vermont, New Jersey, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, California, Connecticut, New York, Illinois, and the
38. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
39. Mark A. Momjian, Cause of Action for Second-ParentAdoption, in 25 CAUSES
OF AcrION 2D. 1, § 1 (2004).
40. Elizabeth Zuckerman, Second ParentAdoption for Lesbian-ParentedFamilies:
Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 729, 731-32 n.8 (1986).
41. Id. at 730-31.
42. Id. at 743-44.
43. Id. at 743.
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District of Columbia-expressly permit second-parent adoption."
Five states-Wisconsin, Ohio, Nebraska, Arkansas (which does not
permit adoption by unmarried couples), and Mississippi (which does
not permit adoption by gay couples) prohibit second-parent adoption.45 There are fifteen other states that allow second-parent adoptions, but only in certain circumstances.4 6
The National Center for Lesbian Rights views the concept of second-parent adoption as protecting the rights of children in same-sex
families.4 7 In a second-parent adoption, two parents become legally
responsible for the child and must fulfill all parental duties.4 8 If the
adoptive parents ever separate, the child can have visitation with the
second parent, the second parent can have custody of the child, and
the second parent will remain responsible for support of the child.4 9
On February 14, 1995, the American Bar Association approved the
Uniform Adoption Act. One of its principle aims is to promote the
interests of minor children being raised by individuals who are committed to, and capable of caring for them.o "The Act encourages different kinds of people to adopt, including individuals who have served
as a minor child's foster or de facto parents." 5 1 Under the Act, no one
may be categorically excluded from being considered as an adoptive
parent. 52
In an article published in 2002, the American Academy of Pediatrics (Academy) advocated allowing second-parent adoptions for children of same-sex partners.5 3 The Academy recognized that in the
interest of the child's health, comfort, and happiness, it is best that
both of the parents are legally recognized as such, even if they are
same-sex parents.5 4 The Academy advocated a broad, nationwide,
ethical mandate to guide the courts in providing a child adopted by a
same-sex couple with the stability of two legally recognized parents.
The Academy noted the following benefits that are created for a
child when he or she has two legally recognized same-sex parents: (1)
44. Ramon Johnson, Gay Adoption: Where Is Gay Adoption Legal?, ABOUT.COM,
http://gaylife.about.com/od/gayparentingadoption/algaycoupleadopt.htm (last visited
Jan. 20, 2011).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Momjian, supra note 39.
48. Id. at §8
49. Id.
50. Id. § 4.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Ellin C. Perrin, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of
Child & Family Health, Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by
Same-Sex Parents, in 109 PEDIATRICS 339, 339 (2002), available at http://pediatrics.
aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/109/2/341.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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the child has a legally assured relationship with both parents, which is
crucial if one parent should become incapacitated or die; (2) both the
child and parents have a right to custody and visitation in the event of
a separation; (3) the child has a right to financial support by both
parents in the event of a separation; (4) the child is eligible for health
benefits from either or both parents; (5) both parents have the legal
ability to consent to the child's medical care; and (6) the child will
have the ability to receive benefits such as social security benefits
from either or both parents in the event of a tragedy.56 Based on
these facts, the Academy recommended that adoptive children of
same-sex parents should have a sense of permanency established for
their legal, physical, and mental well-being.
Eight years after the Academy made the above recommendations
there has not been significant change in the legislature regarding the
adoption of children by same-sex parents.58 Many same-sex parents
have to adopt their children individually. In some states the second
parent may be able to successfully adopt their partner's legally recognized child, but this often requires two separate adoption processes
that can be time consuming and expensive. Second-parent or co-parent adoption is the most adaptable form of adoption that could be
used to help same-sex partners accomplish the goal of adopting a child
together. Other forms of adoptions that may benefit adoptive children of same-sex parents are recognized in only a few states and are
much more complicated.
B.

Joint Adoptions

Joint adoption is a form of adoption that allows two unmarried people to simultaneously adopt a child with whom they have no legal relationship." Joint adoption allows the adoption process to be
completed in one step, rather than one parent adopting a child and
then the other parent filing for a second-parent or co-parent adoption.6 0 Joint adoption gives a child two parents who are legally obligated to provide care and support.'
Single adults and married couples are allowed to adopt children in
all states as long as they meet specified qualifications, and a judge
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Johnson, supra note 42.
59. COURTNEY G. JOsLIN &
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAw

SHANNON P. MINTER, LESBIAN,

§ 5:12 (2009).

GAY,

BISEXUAL AND

60. Id.
61. Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partnersbut Not Parents/ Recognizing Parents
but Not Partners:Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17
N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hum. RTS. 711, 745 (2000).
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finds that the adoption is in the best interest of the child. 6 2 If a married couple is attempting to adopt a child, they must adopt jointly; 63
this requirement tends to indicate a belief that two adults in a committed relationship should both be legally recognized as parents of an
adopted child brought into the family. There would likely be many
more eligible adoptive parents, and therefore more children adopted,
if all states would allow unmarried partners in a committed relationship to adopt jointly. 64
Only a few courts have addressed the issue of joint adoption involving unmarried same-sex partners. 5 California and Massachusetts
have allowed joint adoptions by gay and lesbian couples, but many
other states have denied them. 6 6 Allowing unmarried same-sex
couples to file joint petitions for adoption promotes the rights and
privileges of adoptive children and simplifies and clarifies adoption
law.6 ' The Maine Supreme Court stated that interpreting statutes to
allow joint adoption by same-sex couples promotes the public policy
of creating permanency for adoptive children in a more efficient and
timely manner. 68 Adoption by both same-sex partners will assure
adoptive children a continued relationship with both parents and
makes the children eligible for both public and private benefits extending from both parents, including insurance, social security,
worker's compensation benefits, and intestate succession. 6 9
C.

Equitable Adoptions

Equitable adoption is a form of "adoption" that may, in some instances, be used by a child of same-sex parents as a tool to protect the
child's rights to his or her parent's assets should a parent die intestate.
A child who was never formally adopted by one or both of his or her
parents may be able to assert that he or she was equitably adopted,
which would allow him or her to inherit from his or her adoptive parents should they die intestate.7 0 In order for a successful equitable
adoption to occur, five elements must be proven: (1) an agreement
must have existed between the natural parents and the adoptive parents; (2) the natural parents must have performed by giving up the
62. Cynthia R. Mabry, Joint and Shared Parenting: Valuing All Families and All
Children in the Adoption Process with an Expanded Notion of Family, 17 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 659, 660 (2009).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 664.
66. 1 THOMAS JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAw: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

§ 4:68 (2010).

67. In re Adoption of M.A., 2007 ME 123, 1 24-26, 930 A.2d 1088, 1096-97.
68. Id. T1 26, 29, 930 A.2d at 1097-98.
69. Id.
70. Lindsay Ayn Warner, Bending the Bow of Equity: Three Ways Florida Can
Improve Its EquitableAdoption Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 577, 579 (2009).
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child; (3) the child must have performed by living in the adoptive parents' home; (4) the adoptive parents must have partially performed by
raising the child as their own; and (5) the adoptive parent(s) must
have died intestate. 7 ' The adopted child must prove these five elements by clear and convincing evidence. If all the elements of an equitable adoption are proven, the adopted child will be able to inherit
his or her intestate share of the parents' estates; otherwise, this child
will be left without a share of the inheritance.7 2
The principle of equitable adoption is used by courts to allow for a
more equitable and fair outcome based on the "theory that equity regards that as done which ought to have been done."7 Equitable
adoption "protect[s] the interests of a minor child who, through no
fault of his or her own, was never formally and legally adopted by his
or her adoptive parents." 74 Some states refuse to apply the equitable
adoption doctrine because it is a doctrine grounded in probate law.7 5
Even in most states that do recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption, the doctrine is not applied in workers compensation claims or
wrongful death actions. 7 6 Application of the equitable adoption doctrine can provide equity to a child raised by same-sex parents, where
the child knew only the couple as his or her parents, but was never
formally adopted by one or both of them. Equitable adoption was
created to protect the child's interests rather than punish the child;
especially since it is often not the fault of the child that his or her
parents have not completed the necessary documents to create the
legal status of the parent-child relationship.
Equitable adoption is
used by some states as a remedy because "justice, equity and good
faith require it."7 Courts should grant an equitable adoption:
to protect the interest of a child in a case where one has expressly
agreed to adopt such child, or by his acts and conduct has placed
himself in a position where it would be inequitable to permit it to be
asserted that the child was not adopted; [otherwise the best interest
of the child is not served 80
The argument above, used to support the use of equitable adoption,
is the same argument that the Supreme Court should use to support
the principle of representation reinforcement and allow children waiting for parents to be adopted by same-sex couples.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 579-80.
Id. at 585.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 587-588.
Id.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 607.
Hogane v. Ottersbach, 269 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Mo. 1954).
Id.
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The principle of equitable adoption, and the rationale that many
courts have given for its use, seems to bolster the argument that the
rights of children who have not been legally adopted, but who have
formed a parent-child relationship, should have their rights and interests protected by the Court. Although equitable adoption offers some
relief to adoptive children, it is not recognized in all states and it is not
applied in many cases beyond intestate succession. A more broadly
sweeping remedy is necessary to protect the interests of children who
may be adopted by same-sex partners.

IV.

THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN ADOPTIONS

A.

Best Interest of the Child Analysis

In addition to the language of an adoption statute in a particular
jurisdiction, the individual court's analysis of whether an adoption is
in the best interest of a child is one of the most critical findings in most
adoption cases. A review of the subject state's statutes and local practices is required "to determine what criteria must be employed in
making the best interest determination.""' It is also important to
know how a court that is hearing a specific case will weigh each criterion with respect to the others and what subjective factors come into
play in that particular court.8 2 The best interest of the child determination is a critical but very subjective determination and can vary
greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even from courtroom to
courtroom.
There are not many cases that actually outlay the factors that a
court will consider when conducting a best interest of the child analysis; however, in Holley v. Adams, the Supreme Court of Texas summarized the factors that have been previously considered by most
courts. 83
An extended number of factors have been considered by the courts
in ascertaining the best interest of the child. Included among these
are the following: (A) the desires of the child; (B) the emotional
and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (D)
the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by
the agency seeking custody; (G) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may
indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper
one; and (I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
81. Momjian, supra note 39, § 40.
82. Id.
83. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).
84. Id. (citations omitted).
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The court established that the list of factors considered in a best interest of the child analysis, although extensive, was not an exhaustive
list." In some states the best interest of the child (BIC) analysis is
guided by statutes that determine which factors can be considered; in
contrast, there are some states where case law guides the BIC analysis,
and other states allow the judge to decide the factors that the court
will or will not consider when determining BIC.8 6 However, after considering the factors, the ultimate "best interest of the child" decision is
always based on the presiding judge's discretion.8 1
A California court has held that establishing parentage is one of the
first steps toward allowing a child to benefit from a multitude of financial benefits that include: child support, health insurance, social security benefits, inheritance rights, and military benefits." The California
court's acknowledgement that establishing paternity is in the best interest of the child because of the benefits a child can receive from his
or her biological father can easily be analogized to the importance of a
child to be adopted by two parents, even if they are same-sex parents,
because of the benefits the child will receive from two legally recognized parents.
B.

A Judge's Discretion

In determining the best interest of a child in the context of an adoption by a same-sex couple, there have been mixed responses from the
courts. In 2004, the Indiana Court of Appeals stated that:
To deny the children of same-sex partners, as a class, the security of
a legally recognized relationship with their second parent serves no
legitimate state interest. By allowing same-sex adoptions to come
within the step-parent exception of § 448, we are furthering the purposes of the statute as was originally intended by allowing children
of such unions the benefits and security of a legal relationship with
their de facto second parents.8 9
The court also noted that "[a]llowing a second parent to share responsibility for the financial, spiritual, educational, and emotional well-being of the child in a stable, supportive, and nurturing environment can
only be in the best interest of that child." 0
Many BIC analyses, the cornerstone of adoption decisions, seem to
indicate that there is a belief that it is in the best interest of a child to
85. Id.
86. Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child
Standard in American Jurisprudence,10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 369 (2008).
87. Id.
88. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 669 (Cal. 2005) (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7570(a) (West 2005)).
89. In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253,1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (footnote
omitted).
90. Id. at 1256 (quoting In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2003)).
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have two legally recognized and obligated parents when possible. If
this is so, then there is no explanation why courts should disallow children from being adopted by both same-sex partners. It is necessary
for courts to ascertain and protect the best interest of the children. In
instances concerning adoptive children of same-sex couples, it is important for the courts to represent them. They are a minority group
that is not adequately represented in the voting population and therefore cannot influence the legislature through the political process to
implement laws that protect their interests.
V.

ADOPTION STATUTEs-How DRASTICALLY THE STATE
STATUTES VARY

The various adoption statutes that exist throughout the United
States indicate that it may be difficult, if not entirely impossible, for
the state legislatures to act on behalf of children adopted by same-sex
parents in order to ensure that their interests and rights are protected.
There are only a few states that expressly permit joint adoption by
same-sex couples, there are even some states that expressly prohibit
adoption by same-sex couples, and there are many more that do not
expressly indicate either way, whether or not same-sex couples can
adopt jointly. It can be argued that the Equal Protection rights of
adoptive children of same-sex partners are violated because they are
not entitled to the same rights of children born to or adopted by married and/or straight couples.
The lack of uniformity and lack of clarity in many of the current
adoption statutes tend to indicate that change may be required. There
is also an indication that the area of adoption law is often overlooked
or disregarded by the legislature, and it is left out of the political process because only a small subset of the population is effected by the
adoption laws. The following review of the statutes will show that the
variety of language, the outright prohibition of same-sex parent adoptions, and the discretion given to individual judges, necessitates the
use of the representation reinforcement theory to protect the interests
and rights of children that could be adopted by same-sex partners.
A.

Colorado's Adoption Statute

Individual courts' broad interpretations of Colorado's adoption
statute have allowed for same-sex couples to adopt jointly and have
also allowed a same-sex partner to adopt the legally recognized child
of his or her partner. 91 However, not all of the Colorado courts have
agreed with the broad interpretation of the adoption statute, and in
fact have held that second-parent adoption in Colorado was impermissible. The Colorado adoption statute reads as follows:
91. COLo.

REV. STAT.

§ 19-5-202 (2010).
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(1) Any person twenty-one years of age or older, including a foster
parent, may petition the court to decree an adoption. (2) A minor,
upon approval of the court, may petition the court to decree an
adoption. (3) A person having a living spouse from whom he is not
legally separated shall petition jointly with such spouse, unless such
spouse is the natural parent of the child to be adopted or has previously adopted the child.92
In an adoption case in 1996, where two same-sex partners were trying to adopt each other's biological children, the Colorado Court of
Appeals held that same-sex partners could not use the Colorado
adoption statute to obtain a second-parent adoption, and therefore
could not have a legal parent-child relationship with their children.93
This court followed a strict construction of the statutory language and
held that a "best interest of the child" analysis only applies if the
adoption statute is ambiguous. 94 The court decided that the best interest of the child issue was moot because the threshold adoption requirements were not met, and there was no parental liberty interest to
protect because neither of these prospective adoptive parents were
actually the parent of these children." Based on this decision, secondparent adoption was found to be unavailable in Colorado without judicial wrangling of the meaning of the adoption statute.
Lack of clarity and consistency in Colorado's adoption statute's interpretation led the legislature, in 2007, to enact a law that outright
permitted second-parent adoptions by same-sex couples as well as by
unmarried heterosexual couples. 96 This law allows a second-parent to
adopt a legal parent's child as long as a criminal background check
and home study are successfully completed.9 7 However, second-parent adoption is not the same as joint adoption; it is a long and redundant process that must take place after a child has already been legally
adopted by one parent. Proponents of the law claim that it is not a
gay adoption law but a "child-friendly" law that protects families and
the rights of children.9 8
Although Colorado seems to be taking legislative action to remedy
the inequities that some adoptive children have faced, it is a lengthy
process. A change in legislation takes a lot of time, effort, and commitment from the public, and, as is often the case in situations like
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 490-91 (Colo. App. 1996).
Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.

COLo. PROTECTS ALL, EQUAL RIGHTS COLORADO FACT SHEET: COLORADO'S SECOND PARENT ADOPTION LAW, http://www.coloradoprotectsall.info/pdfs/

2NDPARENT ADOPTION.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
97. Id.
98. Jason N.W. Plowman, Note, When Second-Parent Adoption Is the Second-Best
Option: The Case for Legislative Reform As the Next Best Option for Same-Sex
Couples in the Face of Continued Marriage Inequality, 11 SCHOLAR 57, 80 (2008).
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second-parent adoption for same-sex couples, legislative action is usually prompted by a judicial decision on the matter. 99 In states like
Colorado, where courts are split on the interpretation of the adoption
statute, a judicial decision on the matter is available. However, in
states that firmly prohibit second-parent adoption these types of judicial decisions are likely few and far between.
Statutory reform can be much more difficult than a judicial challenge."oo Judicial challenges tend to resolve themselves much more
quickly and involve fewer players.o' Even though some state adoption statutes have been reformed, the difficulty in the reformation
process tends to support the notion that the Supreme Court should
use representation reinforcement to protect the rights to adoptive
children of same-sex couples.
B.

Vermont's Adoption Statute

Standing firmly on one side of the issue, Vermont has an adoption
statute that expressly allows same-sex partners to adopt children
jointly, and it also allows second-parent adoptions by same-sex partners.10 2 The express provisions of the Vermont adoption statute alleviate the confusion of differing statutory interpretations by the courts.
The Vermont adoption statute states:
Subject to this title, any person may adopt or be adopted by another
person for the purpose of creating the relationship of parent and
child between them. (b) If a family unit consists of a parent and the
parent's partner, and adoption is in the best interest of the child, the
partner of a parent may adopt a child of the parent. Termination of
the parent's parental rights is unnecessary in an adoption under this
subsection."
Vermont's adoption statute is a good example of how a handful of
states are protecting the rights of adoptive children of same-sex partners. However, many adoption statutes do not mirror this one.
C.

Florida'sAdoption Statute

Until the end of 2008, Florida had an adoption statute that outright
prohibited same-sex couples from adopting children. § 63.042 read:
(1) Any person, a minor or an adult, may be adopted. (2) The following persons may adopt: (a) A husband and wife jointly; (b) An
unmarried adult; or (c) A married person without the other spouse
joining as a petitioner, if the person to be adopted is not his or her
spouse, and if: 1. The other spouse is a parent of the person to be
99. Id. at 80-81.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. VT.
103. Id.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 15A, § 1-102 (2010).
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adopted and consents to the adoption; or 2. The failure of the other
spouse to join in the petition or to consent to the adoption is excused by the court for good cause shown or in the best interest of
the child. (3) No person eligible to adopt under this statute may
adopt if that person is a homosexual. (4) No person eligible under
this section shall be prohibited from adopting solely because such
person possesses a physical disability or handicap, unless it is determined by the court or adoption entity that such disability or handicap renders such person incapable of serving as an effective
parent.I0 4
Subsection (3) of § 63.042 was eventually found unconstitutional by
In re Adoption of Doe, in which the Florida Circuit Court stated that
the adoption statute disallowing same-sex couples from adopting children "violated foster children's constitutional right to permanency,
protected under the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act." 0 The
court elaborated on its holding by stating that a prohibition on samesex partners adopting children violated the liberty interests of the children because the children were being held in state custody awaiting a
permanent home.' 0 6 It was acknowledged that by disallowing samesex partners the ability to jointly adopt children, the state was denying
children the right to a permanent home.' 0 7
Since the In re Adoption of Doe decision, the Florida legislature
proposed legislation that would repeal subsection (3) of § 63.042 as it
was found unconstitutional.'
The proposed legislation did die however on May 2, 2009, in the House Civil Justice & Courts Policy Committee, and no further action has been taken regarding this matter.' 0 9
This is a clear example of how statutory reform will likely not provide
adoptive children of same-sex couples the rights and protections they
are entitled to.
D.

Mississippi's Adoption Statute

Standing firmly on the other side of the issue, Mississippi has an
adoption statute that does not allow same-sex couples to adopt chil0 The Mississippi
dren that has not yet been found unconstitutional.o"
statute states that the following persons may adopt:
An unmarried adult, a married person jointly with his or her
spouse, a State resident for at least 90 days, except in an agency
adoption, Adoption by persons of the same gender is prohibited."'
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2005), invalidated by In re Adoption of Doe,
2008 WL 5006172, at *29 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
105. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *29.
106. Id. at *24-25.
107. Id. at *25.
108. H.R. 413, 111 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009).
109. See id.
110. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2004 & Supp. 2010).
111. Id. § 93-17-3(1), (4)-(5).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol17/iss3/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V17.I3.4

18

Stewart: Adoption by Same-Sex Couples and the Use of the Representation Re

ADOPTION BY SAME-SEX COUPLES

2011]

365

Mississippi's adoption statute is likewise a clear indication that the
rights of adopted children, especially those children who have the potential to be adopted by same-sex couples, are not being adequately
protected by the legislature or the political process. An outright ban
on the adoption of children by same-sex couples denies many children
the opportunity to have the legal benefits of two parents, not to mention a stable and loving home.
E.

The Problems with Statutory Inconsistencies

These statutes come from a variety of states, and they vary tremendously. It is more common for the state adoption statutes to be ambiguous as to whether or not same-sex partners can adopt children
together. Often, as stated previously, the decision is left up to the
discretion of the judge. The decision to allow an adoption is too critical to the rights and interests of the adoptive children to leave up to a
particular judge's discretion, or to rely on the action of slow moving
and slow adapting legislatures to permit.
Only four states, Vermont, California, Connecticut, and New
Hampshire, have statutory language that can easily be used to allow
both same-sex parents to have adoption rights to a child.1 12 These
four states have based their adoption statutes on the Uniform Adoption Act of 1994, particularly, the provisions that allow anyone to
adopt and create a legally recognized parent-child relationship, without mention of sexual orientation.' 1 3 Judges must be willing to
broadly interpret statutes that do not have explicit language allowing
same-sex parents to jointly adopt in order to allow both parents legal
rights when the adoption has been found to be in the best interest of
the child.' 14 Only six states have recognized the right of a same-sex
this process of
partner to adopt using second-parent adoption, but
adoption is time consuming, costly, and redundant.' 1 5
On the other hand, many state statutes have been interpreted to
prohibit adoptions of children by same-sex couples. 1 ' 6 This is senseless because many of these states do allow one same-sex partner to
adopt the child; the only person suffering is the child who is limited to
having only one instead of two legal parents. Most of these prohibitions are based on a strict construction of the state adoption statute." 7
Congressional findings on adoption noted that there has been a
twenty-four percent increase in the number of children in foster care
112. Lynne Marie Kohm, Megan Lindsey & William Catoe, An InternationalExamination of Same-Sex ParentAdoption, 5 REGENT J. INT'L L. 237, 251 (2007).
113. Id. at 251-52.
114. Id. at 253.
115. Id. at 257-58.
116. Id at 258.
117. Id.
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in this country in the last decade." Many of these children remain in
foster or substitute care solely because of legal barriers that are
preventing their adoption."' The congressional findings also indicate
that in order to promote a healthy life and stability for these children,
as well as to avoid the waste and overspending of public funds, it is
important to facilitate and promote adoptions whenever possible.1 2 0
Even studies by Congress show that children are healthiest when provided with the stability of adopted parents. It is in the best interest of
the child and society to allow adoptions whenever possible. It is for
these reasons that representation reinforcement must be substituted
for the political process and used as a tool for change, instead of statutory reformation, to allow children available for adoption by same-sex
couples to enjoy the stability of a loving home with two legal parents
whenever possible.
VI.

ADOPTION BY EITHER ONE OR Two PARENT(S) AND ITS
EFFECTS ON THE CHILDREN

A.

Statistics-ChildrenAwaiting Adoption

The most recent statistics gathered by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, published in March 2008, revealed that
there are 126,967 children in public foster care waiting to be
adopted. 12 ' This number does not include children who are in foster
homes who are not currently adoptable, but may become adoptable in
the future. 122 The statistics also do not include children over the age of

sixteen.12 3

A prior study by the North American Council on Adoptable Children indicated that there were over 520,000 children in foster care.12 4
Of those, over 120,000 were available for adoption, but only 50,000
are adopted into permanent homes annually. 125 An analysis of the
2000 census went on to note that approximately 250,000 children are
being raised by same-sex couples, but only 12,500 have been legally
adopted.126 In 2003, more than thirty-three percent of adopted fami118. 42 U.S.C. § 5111(a)(5)(A) (2006) (amended 2010).
119. Id. § 5111(a)(4).
120. Id. § 5111(a)(8).
121. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN IN PUBLIC FOSTER
CARE ON SEPTEMBER 3(0H OF EACH YEAR WHO ARE WAITING To BE ADOPTED FY

1999 - FY 2006 (2008), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearch/afcars/
waiting2009.pdf.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Andrea Stone, Both Sides on Gay Adoption Cite Concern for Children,
USATODAY.COM, Feb. 20, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-20gay-adoption-foster_x.htm.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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lies were single-parent families. 127 Although nearly sixty-five percent
of children adopted with state-agency involvement are adopted by
married parents, the number of single parents and co-habitating
couples adopting children is growing at a faster rate than married

couples. 1 28
B.

Studies on Same-Sex Parents and Their Children

The American Academy of Pediatrics (Academy), in a 2002 study,
recommended that pediatricians advocate for initiatives that establish
permanency through co-parent/second-parent adoptions for children
of same-sex partners.12 9
More recently, Michael Lamb, a Cambridge University Developmental Psychologist has asserted that children of same-sex couples are
just as well adjusted as children with two heterosexual parents. 13 0
Lamb testified in federal court, and cited studies that show that samesex parents have very much the same relationship with their children
as heterosexual parents.13 1 Lamb was called to testify for a same-sex
couple who was challenging the California ban on same-sex marriage. 1 3 2 He noted that children of same-sex partners are more likely
to be teased about their parents, but he indicated that studies show
that they are no more likely to be teased more than children with
heterosexual parents.13 3 Lamb's testimony concluded with a statement that studies indicate that children are better off and more properly adjusted when they have two parents who are actively involved in

their lives. 13 4

The Effects of Restrictions on Adoption by Same-Sex Couples
It has previously been alleged that denying same-sex parents the
right to jointly adopt children may be a violation of their parental
rights, but perhaps more importantly, it may be an equal protection
13
By prohibiting children of sameviolation of the children's rights."
sex parents from being adopted by two parents, as would be the case if
C.

127. Mary Eschelbach Hansen, AM. UNIV. & CTR. FOR ADOPTION RESEARCH, AFCARS ADOPTION DATA RESEARCH BRIEF NUMBER 1: ADOPTIVE FAMILY STRUC(2006), http://academic2.american.edu/-mhansen/Invited/adoptivefamily
TURE 6
structure.pdf.
128. Id. at 7.
129. Perrin, supra note 53.
130. Maura Dolan, Children Thrive Equally with Same-Sex, Heterosexual Parents,
Psychologist Testifies at Prop. 8 Trial, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, http://Iatimes
blogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/01/children-thrive-equally-with-same-sex-heterosexualparents-psychologist-testifies-at-prop-8-trial.html.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Julia Frost Davies, Note, Two Moms and a Baby: Protecting the Nontraditional
Family Through Second ParentAdoptions, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1055, 1074 (1995).
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they were children of heterosexual couples, the United States is treating these children differently from others without valid justification.'1 6
In order to use the theory of representation reinforcement to gain
equal treatment for these children, they must be considered a discrete
and insular minority. Once it has been established that a class is a
discrete and insular minority, the class is labeled a suspect class and
legislation regarding them will be reviewed with heightened scrutiny.137 Courts have held that some groups of children who do not
have control over their status are discrete and insular minorities and
deserve to be treated as a suspect class.1 3
In Louisiana v. Levy, the U.S. Supreme Court held that illegitimate
children were entitled to wrongful death benefits although the Louisiana statute at the time only allowed legitimate children to recover. 3 9
The Court noted that a state has power to make laws but may not
"draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination against a
particular class."I 4 0 The Court went on to note that although these
children were illegitimate, the mother had raised and nurtured them;
their status of illegitimacy was through no fault of their own so they
did not deserve the unfair and unequal treatment.14 1
Likewise, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, the U.S.
Supreme Court analyzed a Louisiana statute that disqualified illegitimate children from recovering workman's compensation benefits after
the death of a parent.14 2 The Court noted that society has long condemned the action of parents bearing children outside of a marriage
and nuclear family. 1 43 The Court also noted that it is unfair to make
innocent children suffer because of their parent's mistakes.14 4 According to the Court, "[v]isiting this condemnation on the head of the
infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility and wrongdoing." 14 5 It can hardly be argued that a child is responsible for the actions of his or her parents, be it the parents' marital
status, as in this case, or the parents' sexual orientation as in the case
of adoptive children of same-sex partners.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See id.
Id. at 1075.
Id.
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1972).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

Many people mistakenly compare the issue of adoption of children
by same-sex couples to the issue of same-sex marriage. As Jon
Husted, a Republican politician who was adopted as a child, has proclaimed, "This is not an issue about gays, this is about children. .. "146
It has been said that unlike bans on same-sex marriages, disallowing
same-sex couples the right to adopt children is likely to be viewed as
overreaching and punitive, and is an action that the majority of the
public would not support.14 7
Unfortunately, conclusions about the public sentiment regarding a
ban on same-sex couples adopting is not conclusive evidence that the
public is cognizant enough to utilize the legislature and political system to ensure that the rights of adoptive children are protected. Although polls show that the public is unlikely to support a ban on samesex adoption, this does not indicate that the public is willing to use the
political arena to ensure adoptive children in same-sex families equal
rights and equal representation under the law. The current state adoption statutes and their various effects lend credence to the argument
that the public will not take action on the adoptive children's behalf.
The representation reinforcement principle is designed specifically
to help classes of people just like potential adoptive children of samesex couples. Although adoptive children of same-sex couples can arguably be represented politically by their parents, many of these children are foster children awaiting an adoptive family and therefore
have no representation. It is possible that more same-sex couples
would be willing to adopt children if they had the ability to take on
the rights and responsibilities together, as most parents prefer to do.
The ability to have two parents responsible for one or more children
also ensures that the child or children will receive social security benefits, health care benefits, intestate succession, child support, visitation
rights, and workman's compensation benefits, just to name a few.
By allowing both same-sex parents to adopt, children like TiCasey
and her siblings will be given the stability and support that they deserve. Representation reinforcement by the courts will ensure that
these children, who by no fault of their own, have no parents or have
only one legal same-sex parent, will at least have the opportunity to
have the privileges given to children who have a legal relationship
with both of their parents. It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue
that it is more beneficial to have one legal parent instead of two.
146. Stone, supra note 124.
147. Id.
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